This paper proposes a methodology similar to that of Flexible Deterrent Options, which allows planning for all elements of national power to be employed, singly, or in unison, to achieve deterrent effect.
"Clearly^ the complexity of meeting the challenges of regional stability demands the use of all the elements of national power... . A key question is how to integrate them effectively... .
The current approach to addressing national security engages the Department of Defense and services too often and too quickly in situations that should have been resolved by non¬ military means.
... Put in a more positive way, by strengthening our diplomatic, political, economic, and other assistance efforts, we may be able to prevent the breakdown of order, which requires the use of military force.
The role of peacetime deterrence is a concept consistently found in current U.S. national security documents -all of which are derived from the Quadrennial Defense Review and its concept of Shape, Respond and Prepare.
The National Security Strategy The talons of the eagle remain partially sheathed because of the lack of structure at the national level for developing deterrent options for use during crises. This paper will demonstrate that the requisite tools are in place, the processes and concepts that will allow the eagle to unsheathe its talons, already exist. They simply must be brought together at the appropriate level and at the appropriate time.
THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. DETERRENCE
The purpose of deterrence has remained universal: "policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat of military retaliation, that the costs of using military force to resolve political conflict will outweigh the benefits."^ This persuasion can be achieved by denying the aggressor his military objectives, thereby requiring a symmetrical and more powerful military capability on the part of the deterrer. Another way to achieve this persuasion is to punish the aggressor by attacking his leadership, population centers or other targets which will impose intolerable pain, suffering or damage to his people or regime. The capabilities required to punish must also be powerful; however, asymmetrical means may be more effective at punishment than merely a stronger set of symmetrical forces.® The U.S. has relied on deterrence as a means to further its interests and those of its allies around the world. Deterrence in the post-World War II era was cast in the context of the bipolar Cold war and the advent of nuclear weapons. U.S.
strategic concepts for deterrence in the Cold War ran the gamut from Eisenhower's "Massive Retaliation" through "Flexible
Response", to "Mutual Assured Destruction". Each of these concepts relied upon military instruments, and in particular, nuclear weapons to achieve deterrence. Even the strategy of employing conventional forces in a Flexible Response scenario, had at its core the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. In all these concepts, the deterrent value of nuclear weapons was primarily in their ability to inflict punishment on an adversary.
This ability to inflict enormous destruction has led to the concept of "self deterrence" in which the destruction brought about by a nuclear response to an attack on the U.S. or an ally is viewed as irrational, and therefore no U.S. nuclear response is launched.® Coexisting with nuclear weapons and thresholds for their use were threats to which conventional forces posed a more credible deterrent. For example, there was the understanding, that the nuclear threshold would not be crossed in a conflict with a lesser-developed nation because of the potential for worldwide outrage. Nevertheless, deterrence strategy during the Cold War was primarily focused on achieving "global deterrence of a single adversary on a regional basis".^ This strategy had its limitations and problems, which changed when the Cold War ended.
But the end of that twilight conflict did not simplify the basic problem of how to achieve deterrence.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the U.S. In order to achieve best effectiveness and economy, the national security architecture must address deterrence as a multidimensional function, employing all appropriate elements of national power to achieve synchronized effects. Deterrence through the use of all elements of national power is not something new; what will be new is a disciplined, interagency approach that anticipates the requirement to deter an aggressor rather than a procedural void that guarantees that the U.S. will have to react to react.
FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS
Although an interagency approach to deterrence does not exist at the national level, DOD has taken steps, albeit marginally effective ones, to fill it by requiring regional CINCs These menus are prepared by theater level planners during deliberate peacetime planning and should represent the best advice of those planners on how the elements of national power could best be employed, either as discrete acts or in concert, to achieve synergistic deterrent effects in a specific situation.
If deterrence fails, at worst the US is postured to quickly defeat an adversary. the message sent to our adversaries, will rely on this multidimensional wielding of national power.
The lack of adequate planning for the employment of non-military FDOs will virtually ensure that they will not be employed at the right time.
The capability and the credibility required to achieve deterrence will suffer as non- "While agencies of government have developed independent capacities to respond to complex emergencies, military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning...early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is successful for the success of the mission."^"
Crisis response policy has three key elements: the capability to respond across the full spectrum of crises, selectivity in responding to crises based on U.S. interests and the capability to make a difference, and finally, the prescience to "use the most appropriate tool or combination of toolsacting in alliance ... or unilaterally...".^^ The NMS also outlines a crisis response policy nested in the national level policy.
It's components include; deterrence of aggression or coercion in crisis, the ability to fight and win major theater wars, and the ability to conduct multiple, concurrent small scale contingencies.
Clearly, deterrence is a component of national security critical in underpinning both the NSS and the NMS. The range of threats requiring a crisis response as outlined in the NSS includes terrorism, international crime, drug and arms trafficking, environmental concerns and natural disasters, SSCs and MTWs. Deterrence of these threats (those which can be deterred, unlike natural disasters) is the primary policy goal, followed by the capability to respond across the full spectrum.
The NSS recognizes that, for both reasons of economy, and for maximum effectiveness, deterrence must be undertaken using, as appropriate, any and all of the full range of instruments of national power. In fact, this integrated, interagency approach to crisis response is lauded in the NSS for its success in combating terrorism, reducing drug trafficking, and countering international crime cartels. . In the case of SSC and MTW, an integrated, interagency approach to deterrence is unrealized and will remain unrealized as long as the U.S. lacks the ways, namely a policy at the national level, to achieve deterrence of SSCs and
MTWs using all the available instruments of national power^^.
Effective deterrence is clearly the first and the preferred response to an impending crisis. With deterrence as a critical component of U.S. capability to shape the strategic landscape and respond to crises, it is reasonable to expect that there would be readily available a rigorous structure designed to quickly what is required is a more ordered, structured and disciplined way to plan for and employ the elements of national power.
While flexibility in the national security architecture is an asset, a lack of permanent structure and procedures, and significant changes in these aspects from one administration to another leave us with an architecture which may or may not approach critical national security challenges with the concomitant level of discipline. The process at the core of our national security architecture is the working of the NSC system. This process is capable of being subjected to some rigor. FDD 56 is one such attempt to bring some rigor to the interagency process that produces national security policy for peace Crisis may be an extreme example of the kind of crises the U.S.
will face on a routine basis in the post-Cold War world, it serves as a reminder of the wisdom of having well thought out ideas available when time is short and stress is. high.
Execution of timely, well orchestrated and effective deterrent actions will only serve to enhance the value of future deterrent endeavors. In this case, success will breed success.
When potential aggressors see the U.S. rapidly employing multidimensional deterrent instrioments, the Credibility of U.S.
will to deter will be enhanced. If the U.S. can maintain the integrity of alliances and still achieve deterrence through non¬ military means, its credibility as a multilateral partner and international seeker of peace will be enhanced. In this case, deterrence need not "fail" in order to reinforce credibility^®.
In addition to the credibility gained by timely, well The national level security apparatus has evolved to a point where it is capable of conducting planning as envisioned by this proposal. As demonstrated by the relative success of PDD 56, the interagency process can be subjected to rigor. Cooperation and unity of purpose can be achieved on the national level only by planning in an interagency forum. The interagency process is the forum in which complex, concept based planning must be conducted.
It allows all participants in future actions a voice in what will be accomplished and how it will be achieved. Concurrence on these matters, in advance, by all involved U.S. government agencies is critical in achieving speed and synergy in the application of national power.
This proposal uses as its means all the instruments of national power. The way centers on a regionally oriented, integrated, efficiency-driven, deliberate process, which results in synchronized, fully developed options for decision-makers to employ in order to achieve the end: deterrence during crises.
This proposal will provide the U.S. with an opportunity to conduct preparations for shaping the environment and responding to crises with actions that achieve deterrence. The eagles'
talons will be unsheathed and work in concert to that end.
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